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OIL, GAS, AND MINERAL LAW
by
Eric T. Laity*
HIS Article surveys the significant developments of the past year in
the Texas law of oil, gas, and minerals. The Article limits its analysis
to Texas and federal court decisions and Texas Legislative acts.'
I. CASES
A. Conveyancing
Mineral Reservations. In Patrick v. Barrett2 the Texas Supreme Court
considered a case in which a grantor reserved one-half of a mineral estate
encumbered by a previously reserved royalty interest. The court held that
the grantor reserved one-half of the royalty under any subsequent oil and gas
lease when the grantor expressly excepted the previously reserved royalty
interest from the general conveyance.3 In a 1950 deed the Patricks conveyed
a tract of land to the Barretts subject to various exceptions and reservations.
The deed excepted a one-sixteenth royalty interest that had been reserved by
the Tuers, who had granted the land to the Patricks. The deed also provided
for an exception and reservation to the Patricks, their heirs, and assigns of
an undivided one-half interest in the mineral estate, except a one-thirty sec-
ond royalty interest in the mineral estate, which the Patricks specifically
conveyed to the Barretts.4
Both the Patricks and the Barretts conceded in their briefs that in 1950 oil
and gas leases for land in their locale usually provided for a landowner roy-
alty of one-eighth. The Patricks and the Barretts disputed, however, the
share of royalties the Barretts were entitled to under an oil and gas lease
* B.A., J.D., Harvard University. Attorney at Law, Thelen, Marrin, Johnson &
Bridges, Houston, Texas.
1. The law of oil, gas, and minerals historically focused only on the exploration and
production of minerals and hydrocarbons. Pursuant to this tradition, the law of oil, gas, and
minerals has not included the legal aspects of the transportation, refining, and marketing of
minerals and hydrocarbons. The organization and financing of enterprises that conduct these
activities also are not within the ambit of oil, gas, and mineral law. This Article preserves the
traditional focus on exploration and production.
2. 734 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. 1987).
3. Id. at 648.
4. This account of the facts of the case is synthesized from the opinions of the Texas
Supreme Court and the Beaumont Court of Appeals. Patrick v. Barrett, 724 S.W.2d 418 (Tex.
App.-Beaumont 1987), rev'd, 734 S.W.2d 646 (Tex, 1987). This Article simplifies the facts of
the case for the purposes of the Survey. The Barretts making the appeal are the successors in
interest to the grantees under the Patricks' deed. The Patricks in this suit are the successors in
interest to the Patricks who signed the deed in contention.
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given on the property. The Patricks argued that their reservation of one-half
of the mineral estate also reserved to them one-half of any landowner royalty
payable under a lease. According to the Patricks, the one-sixteenth royalty
interest reserved by the Tuers and duly excepted by the Patricks in their
conveyance to the Barretts should be charged entirely against the Barretts'
one-half of the mineral estate. Under this position, the specific grant by the
Patricks to the Barretts would have left the Patricks with a share of the
landowner royalty under any oil and gas lease equalling one-half of the roy-
alty less one-thirty second of all production under the lease. In the case of a
lease providing for a one-eighth landowner royalty, the lease would entitle
the Patricks to one-thirty second of all production under the lease and entitle
the Barretts to the same fraction of production. In the case of a lease provid-
ing for a landowner royalty of three-sixteenths, the 1950 deed would entitle
the Patricks to one-sixteenth of all production under the lease and entitle the
Barretts to one-thirty second of all production. 5
The court of appeals disagreed with the Patricks' argument. 6 The court of
appeals cited Benge v. Scharbauer7 for the proposition that unless the parties
clearly agreed otherwise, a grantee received a royalty interest proportionate
to the mineral interest he received in the deed.8 Benge arguably supports the
court of appeal's statement if the royalty interest to which the court of ap-
peals refers is an interest in the landowner royalty specified in an oil and gas
lease and if the grantee denotes the person receiving the benefit of a convey-
ance or reservation. A fuller statement of the court of appeal's proposition
would be that unless the parties clearly agree otherwise, a person receives a
share in the landowner royalty under a lease proportionate to the mineral
interest he receives or reserves in the deed.9
The court of appeals applied the Benge rule to the Barretts' deed with
surprising results. According to the court, when the Patricks conveyed one-
half of the mineral estate by means of the 1950 deed, they conveyed to the
Barretts one-half of the remaining one-sixteenth royalty interest.' 0 The
court failed to conclude, at that point in its analysis, that the Barretts re-
ceived a one-half interest in any landowner royalty payable under a lease or
that the one-sixteenth royalty interest held by the Tuers should be charged
against the Patricks' one-half interest in such landowner royalties." The
court also failed to find that the Patricks retained a one-half interest in any
landowner royalty payable under a lease or that the one-sixteenth royalty
interest held by the Tuers should be charged against the Barretts' one-half
5. 734 S.W.2d at 648. After the Patricks conveyed the land to the Barretts in 1950, the
Tuers conveyed their one-sixteenth royalty interest to the Patricks. This Article, however, will
treat that one-sixteenth royalty interest as separate from the interests retained by the Patricks
under their 1950 deed to the Barretts.
6. 724 S.W.2d at 419.
7. 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166, 169 (1953).
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interest in such landowner royalties. 12
The court of appeals mistakenly believed that the Benge rule stated that a
party to a deed receives a share in the remainder of the landowner royalty
(after the prior rights of third parties are satisfied) proportionate to the min-
eral interest he receives or reserves in the deed.' 3 Under this incorrect inter-
pretation of the Benge rule, the conveyance would have to include an express
agreement between the parties in order to entitle the grantor to one-half of
the total landowner royalty under his reserved one-half mineral interest.
The result in Benge contradicts this interpretation of the Benge rule. 14
Under a correct interpretation of Benge, the Patricks would be entitled to
one-half of the total landowner royalty, unless their deed to the Barretts
expressly stated otherwise. After concluding that the Patricks retained only
a one-half interest in the remaining one-sixteenth royalty interest, the court
of appeals held that the Patricks' grant of a one-thirty second royalty inter-
est to the Barretts in the deed left the Patricks with no interest at all in the
landowner royalties payable under a lease.' 5 The Barretts, therefore, re-
tained the entire remaining one-sixteenth royalty interest.' 6
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. '7
The supreme court failed to take issue with the manner in which the court of
appeals applied the Benge rule. Rather, the supreme court found an express
statement in the Patricks' deed that non-proportionate shares of royalty
were conveyed.' 8 The supreme court found that the express exception of a
royalty interest in favor of the Tuers constituted an express statement.' 9
The 1950 deed, therefore, provided that the Patricks and the Barretts each
held a one-thirty second royalty interest.20
The result in Barrett is incorrect in one regard. An oil and gas lease may
provide for a landowner royalty greater than one-eighth. 2 1 The court, there-
fore, should not have declared the Patricks the owners of a one-thirty second
royalty interest under the 1950 deed. Under the court's reasoning, the Pa-
tricks were entitled to one-half of the landowner royalty payable under
whatever lease then in force, less a one-thirty second interest in favor of the
Barretts, in production from the lease.2 2 The Barretts were entitled to the
same amount: one-half of the landowner royalty under the lease, less a one-
sixteenth royalty interest in favor of the Patricks' own grantor, plus the one-




14. 152 Tex. 447, 453, 259 S.W.2d 166, 169 (1953).
15. 724 S.W.2d at 419.
16. Id.




21. See 724 S.W.2d at 421-22 (Brookshire, J., dissenting) (stating that the actual land-
owner royalty specified in the applicable lease is one-sixth).
22. 734 S.W.2d at 648.
19881
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Inconsistent Granting and Future-Lease Clauses. In Hawkins v. Texas Oil
and Gas Corp.23 the Waco Court of Appeals held that a deed conveyed a
permanent one-thirty second royalty interest. The granting clause of the
deed conveyed a one-thirty second royalty interest in the property. The
"subject-to" clause of the deed further provided that the conveyance in-
cluded one-fourth of the one-eight royalty under the existing lease. A third
clause of the deed reserved the executive rights and delay rentals to the
grantors.2 4 The future-lease clause of the deed, however, stated the parties'
agreement that upon the expiration of the then-current lease, the grantees
would own a one-half interest in the minerals underlying the described
property.
The Hawkins court examined three separate methods of analysis that the
Texas Supreme Court had previously used in reconciling apparently conflict-
ing deed provisions.25 These three methods of analysis originated in Hoff-
man v. Magnolia Petroleum Co.,26 Alford v. Krum,27 and Garrett v. Dils
Co. 28 In Hoffman the Texas Commission of Appeals formulated the two-
grant theory, under which the court resolved an apparent inconsistency be-
tween the granting and the subject-to clauses of a deed by determining that
the parties intended two separate conveyances. 29 The Hoffman court held
that the deed conveyed an interest in the royalties payable under the current
lease and that it also conveyed a separately measured interest in the rever-
sionary interest in the mineral estate.30
In Alford the Texas Supreme Court resolved an inconsistency between a
deed's granting clause and its future-lease clause in favor of the granting
clause. 31 The granting clause, the court stated, contained the parties' "key
expression of intent."' 32 The court said that the parties merely intended the
future-lease clause to explain or restate the operative effect of the grant in the
event of the termination of any present lease and the execution of any future
leases. 33 The Hawkins court concluded that Alford did not overrule the two-
grant doctrine. 34
The Garrett case involved a deed containing a granting clause that con-
flicted with both the subject-to clause and the future-lease clause. The Gar-
rett court held that the parties intended to convey the interest described in
the subject-to and future-lease clauses rather than the interest set forth in the
23. 724 S.W.2d 878, 888 (Tex. App.-Waco 1987, no writ).
24. Compounding the confusion, this third clause also provided that the grantees were to
receive one-fourth of all minerals produced under any future lease.
25. 724 S.W.2d at 883-88.
26. 273 S.W.2d 828, 830 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1925, holding approved).
27. 671 S.W.2d 870, 872-73 (Tex. 1984).
28. 157 Tex. 92, 96-97, 299 S.W.2d 904, 907 (1957).
29. Hoffman, 273 S.W.2d at 830.
30. Id. at 830-31.
31. Alford, 671 S.W.2d at 872-73.
32. Id. at 872.
33. Id. at 873 (citing R. HEMINGWAY, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 9.1, at 411-13
(1971); 3A W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 6.06, at 375-82 (1927)).
34. Hawkins, 724 S.W.2d at 886.
[Vol. 42
OIL, GAS, AND MINERAL LAW
granting clause. 35 The granting clause was the only provision in the deed
inconsistent with the other deed provisions, which all described an interest
different from the interest mentioned in the granting clause.
The Hawkins court held that the deed's granting clause controlled and
cited Alford in support of its holding. 36 The Hawkins court refused to apply
the two-grant doctrine employed by the Hoffman court.37 The Hawkins
court applied the Alford doctrine for two reasons. First, the Hawkins court
distinguished the provisions of the Hawkins deed from the deed provisions in
Hoffman and other cases applying the two-grant doctrine. 38 The Hawkins
court distinguished Hoffman since Hoffman did not involve inconsistent
clauses purporting to measure the mineral interest received by the grantee
after the expiration of the current lease on the property.39 Second, the Haw-
kins court noted the similarities between the provisions of the Alford deed
and the Hawkins deed.40 The Hawkins court concluded that the application
of Alford voided the future-lease clause in the Hawkins deed to the extent it
was inconsistent with the granting clause. 41 The court then suggested that
because the Hawkins deed's reference to a mineral interest was void and
because the Hawkins grantees therefore received only a royalty interest, the
court did not need to apply the two-grant theory.42 The court's opinion
suggests, therefore, that the Alford approach is a threshold test that courts
must apply before resorting to the two-grant theory. The Hawkins court
also cited Garrett in support of its holding that the granting clause controlled
the interpretation of the deed.43 In citing Garrett, the Hawkins court noted
that the Hawkins deed specifically denied the grantees any interest in future
delay rentals.44 If the grantors had intended to convey a mineral interest
rather than a royalty interest to the grantees, then the grantees would have
35. 157 Tex. at 96-97, 299 S.W.2d at 907.
36. 724 S.W.2d at 886.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. The granting clause and the future lease clause of a deed both give indications of
the grantor's intentions concerning the quantum of interest the grantee will enjoy upon the
current lease's expiration. The Hawkins court stated:
Unlike the deed in Alford v. Krum, none of the decisions highlighted above as
illustrating the two-grant theory involved an expansion or limitation of the
granting clause by a subsequent clause in the deed. Instead, the second grant
was compatible with and in addition to whatever interest was conveyed by the
granting clause. This cannot be said of the deed in Alford v. Krum nor of the
[Hawkins deed].
Id. The court's intended meaning is difficult to ascertain from the quoted language.
40. Id. The court's statement may reflect the court's observation that the same pairing of
clauses in the two deeds were inconsistent. Language elsewhere in the opinion, however, sug-
gests that the court believed that precedent dictated a determination that an inconsistency
existed between the Hawkins deed's granting clause and its future-lease clause. See Id. at 883.
For example, the court stated that "the granting clause conflicts irreconcilably with the future-
lease clause, based on the decision in Alford v. Krum, and the granting clause must prevail to
the extent of the conflict." Id.
41. Id. at 886.





received an interest in the delay rentals.45
B. Mother Hubbard Clauses
In Jones v. Colle46 the Texas Supreme Court held that a Mother Hubbard
clause in an oil and gas lease only covers relatively small tracts of land that
may exist unknown to one or both of the parties to a lease. One of the
parties' clear expression of an intention to include in the lease a larger tract
known to him is irrelevant to the scope of the Mother Hubbard clause.47
The mineral interest disputed in Jones v. Colle was leased from Winifred
Curry. Curry owned mineral interests in two adjoining tracts of land, one
consisting of 68.72 acres and the other consisting of 49.34 acres. Curry
owned only part of the minerals under each tract. In the first tract Curry
owned 28.84 mineral acres, and in the second tract Curry owned 20.7 min-
eral acres. Combined, Curry's mineral interests in the two tracts amounted
to 49.54 mineral acres.
In 1978 Colle obtained a receivership lease from the appropriate district
court that purported to cover 49.34 mineral acres under Curry's first tract.
Although the Colle lease did not describe the second tract as part of the land
covered by the lease, the Colle lease did include a Mother Hubbard clause
providing that the lease also included additional land contiguous or adjacent
to or adjoining the land purported to be conveyed if the lessor owned the
additional land or claimed it by limitation, prescription, possession, rever-
sion of an unrecorded instrument, or if the lessor had a preferential right of
acquisition. Colle knew of the existence of both tracts of land and had pre-
pared the receivership lease.
Five years later, Curry gave an oil and gas lease to Jones covering both
tracts of land. Jones and Colle each believed himself to be the first lessee of
Curry's mineral interest in the second tract. Colle argued that the Mother
Hubbard clause in his receivership lease was sufficient to convey Curry's
mineral interest in the second tract to him, since the reference in the receiv-
ership lease to 49.54 mineral acres clearly showed an intention to cover
Curry's interest in both tracts. In response, Jones relied on Smith v. Al-
lison,48 in which the Texas Supreme Court stated that the purpose of a
Mother Hubbard clause was "to prevent the leaving of small unleased pieces
or strips of land,. . . which may exist without the knowledge of one or both
of the parties by reason of incorrect surveying, careless location of fences, or
other mistakes."'49
The Texas Supreme Court ratified the Allison court's language, and held
that a Mother Hubbard clause only covers property not described in the
conveyance when the property consists of small unleased pieces of land that
45. Id.
46. 727 S.W.2d 262, 263 (Tex. 1987).
47. Id.
48. 157 Tex. 220, 301 S.W.2d 608 (1957).
49. Id. at 229, 301 S.W.2d at 615 (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Bennett, 125 Tex. 540, 549, 84
S.W.2d 447, 452 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1935)).
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may exist without the knowledge of one or both of the parties.50 The Colle
court further held that a clear intention to convey a larger tract of land than
that specifically described in the conveyance will not expand the scope of the
Mother Hubbard clause.5 '
C. Paying Quantities, Commercial Quantities, and Unprofitable
Operations
In El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. American Petrofina Co.5 2 a Texas court of
appeals held that, in determining whether the operation of a well on the lease
had become unprofitable for the assignee under a reassignment clause of the
assignment, a court may consider as a cost an overriding royalty in favor of
the assignor of the oil and gas lease. The court held that the anticipated
costs of drilling a development well, together with the cost of the overriding
royalty, could be taken into account in determining whether production in
commercial quantities was likely from undeveloped acreage under a separate
reassignment clause of the assignment.5 3 El Paso Natural Gas ("El Paso")
took an assignment from American Petrofina comprising several oil and gas
leases covering land located in the San Juan Basin of New Mexico.5 4 In
return for the assignment, American Petrofina retained an overriding royalty
in each lease. The lease defined the overriding royalty in terms of a special
dollar amount for each thousand cubic feet of gas produced under the lease,
rather than as a percentage of production. The amount of the overriding
royalty was subject to escalation over time and was subject to arbitration
after an initial term. After an unusual and complicated series of events, El
Paso's cost from the overriding royalty became greater than the proceeds
from the gas.
El Paso tendered a reassignment of the leases to American Petrofina. The
terms of the original assignment entitled El Paso to reassign any well and its
proration unit to American Petrofina if the well became uprofitable for El
Paso. American Petrofina relied on Clifton v. Koontz" for the proposition
that a court could not consider an overriding royalty as a cost in determining
whether a lease was operating at a profit. If each well produced in paying
quantities, American Petrofina argued, the well operated at a profit.
The court rejected American Petrofina's arguments and held in favor of El
Paso.56 The court distinguished Koontz because that case involved the ques-
tion of whether a lease was producing in paying quantities, rather than the
question of whether it was operating at a profit. 57 If a lease58 had to cease
50. Colle, 727 S.W.2d at 263.
51. Id.
52. 733 S.W.2d 541, 543-48 (Tex. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1986, no writ).
53. Id. at 549.
54. The facts of this case have been simplified considerably for discussion.
55. 160 Tex. 82, 92-93, 325 S.W.2d 684, 692-93 (1959).
56. El Paso, 733 S.W.2d at 549, 555-56.
57. Id. at 549.




production in paying quantities before the lease could be considered unprof-
itable, the court said, the reassignment clause would be meaningless.5 9 If a
lease stopped producing in paying quantities, then the lease would terminate
according to its terms, and there would be nothing to reassign to American
Petrofina.60 The court held that the cost of the overriding royalty could be
considered in determining whether a well was operating profitably. 6'
The terms of the original assignment entitled El Paso to reassign to Amer-
ican Petrofina any drilling unit in the event development near the unit
demonstrated the unit would not produce gas in commercial quantities.62
The court of appeals held that an operator may consider the cost of drilling
and equipping a well, in addition to the cost of the overriding royalty, in
assessing whether the acreage will produce in commercial quantities. 63 In
this case of first impression with regard to defining production in commer-
cial quantities, the court of appeals held that the cost of drilling and equip-
ping a well could be considered only if such expense had not yet been
incurred by the lessee. 64 The court's opinion suggests that, in general, if an
operator has already drilled and completed a well, the operator cannot in-
clude the expense of drilling and equipping in determining whether the well
will produce in commercial quantities.65
Under the reassignment clause for unprofitable wells, American Petrofina
had the option to sell gas from any reassigned wells to El Paso for the high-
est price El Paso or any other bona fide pipeline company paid for gas of like
quality in the field. Because of the costs associated in building pipelines, El
Paso had a competitive edge in bidding to purchase the production from the
reassigned wells. In effect, the combination of the option to sell reassigned
gas to El Paso and the reassignment clause gave El Paso an effective cap on
the royalty burden encumbering El Paso's ownership of the wells subse-
quently reassigned to American Petrofina. Once the royalty burden in-
creased to a level in excess of the prevailing field price for gas, El Paso could
reassign the wells without jeopardizing the flow of production from those
wells into its pipeline system. Despite the change in ownership of the wells
and the attendant shift from El Paso to American Petrofina of the monetary
obligation to pay landowner royalties and of the operator responsibilities, the
net economic effect on El Paso of the reassignment was the lowering of its
costs associated with production from the wells.
59. 733 S.W.2d at 548.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 547.
62. More specifically the reassignment clause permitted El Paso to reassign a drilling unit
in the event that operations on nearby property demonstrated that the unit would not produce
from the Mesaverde Formation. If El Paso reassigned the drilling unit, the reassignment re-
lieved El Paso of its obligation to test the Mesaverde Formation. The lease entitled El Paso to
retain any wells within the units producing from different formations.
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D. Royalties on Sour Gas
In Schwartz v. Prairie Producing Co. 66 the Houston Court of Appeals held
that a landowner royalty on hydrogen sulfide gas produced from a gas well
was to be computed under the gas royalty clause of the governing lease
rather than under the lease's sulphur royalty clause. The Schwartz leases
produced sour gas, which is a mixture of natural gas and hydrogen sulfide
gas. Pursuant to a contract with Cities Service Co., Prairie Producing deliv-
ered the sour gas to Cities Service at the wellhead. Cities Service then trans-
ported the sour gas to its processing plant and extracted elemental sulphur
from the hydrogen sulfide gas. Cities Service kept a small portion of the
sulphur that it extracted and delivered the bulk of the sulphur back to Prai-
rie Producing for sale to third parties. The Schwartz court characterized the
transaction between Prairie Producing and Cities Service as a sale by Prairie
Producing of hydrogen sulfide gas to Cities Service, 67 although the court did
not specifically discuss the terms of the parties' agreement. The court failed
to discuss the disposition of the natural gas that remained after extraction of
the hydrogen sulfide and the method for calculating the landowner royalty
on the sweet natural gas.
The Schwartz leases provided for a landowner royalty of one-fourth of the
amount Prairie Producing realized from selling the gas at the wellhead. The
leases also provided for a landowner royalty of one-fourth of the gas's mar-
ket value at the wellhead if Prairie Producing used the gas off the lease or in
manufacturing gasoline or other products. Finally, the Schwartz leases pro-
vided for a landowner royalty of one dollar per long ton on sulphur mined
and marketed. Prairie Producing tendered a landowner royalty of one dollar
per long ton of sulphur extracted from the sour gas to the Schwartzes. The
Schwartzes refused the payments and claimed a landowner royalty of one-
fourth of the value Prairie Producing received for the hydrogen sulfide gas.
The Schwartzes contended the value of the hydrogen sulfide equalled one-
fourth of Prairie Producing's net proceeds from the sale of the elemental
sulphur Cities Service delivered to Prairie.
The Schwartz court stated that the issue was whether the Schwartzes
should have received landowner royalties under the hydrogen sulfide gas
clause or under the sulphur clause of the leases.68 The court of appeals held
that hydrogen sulfide gas was the substance produced by the well and that
the landowner royalties should, therefore, be computed under the gas roy-
alty clause. 69 The court reasoned that sulphur was not actually mined, but
was extracted from the hydrogen sulfide gas. 7 0 The court's decision accords
with the Fifth Circuit's decision in First National Bank v. Pursue Energy
66. 727 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1987, no writ) (citing First
Nat'l Bank v. Pursue Energy Corp., 799 F.2d 149, 152-53 (5th Cir. 1986)).
67. Id. at 292 n. 1 (stating the case involved a sale of hydrogen sulfide gas rather than a
sale of sulphur).
68. Id. at 290.




Corp.7 1 The Schwartz court noted that it was faced with a legal issue and
royalty clause identical to those faced by the Pursue court.72
Prairie Producing relied on Southland Royalty Co. v. Pan American Petro-
leum Corp. 73 for the proposition that a producer could characterize a natural
gas well as a mine. Prairie Producing argued that the language of the
sulphur royalty clause in the Schwartz leases included sulphur produced
from hydrocarbon wells. The Schwartz court rejected Prairie Producing's
argument and refused to extend the Southland Royalty holding to the facts
in Schwartz.74 The Schwartz court cited the general rule that mineral leases
are strictly construed in favor of the lessor.7 5 The plurality opinion in
Schwartz limits the case's precedential value. 76
E. Forced Pooling
In Buttes Resources Co. v. Railroad Commission 77 the Houston Court of
Appeals held that a voluntary offer to pool was not unreasonable under the
Texas Mineral Interest Pooling Act (the "MIPA") 78 if the offer did not in-
clude a risk premium for drilling and completing the well. The Buttes court
held that a voluntary offer to pool was not unreasonable if it proposed to
include within the pooled unit unproductive acreage once capable of produc-
ing from the reservoir underlying the proposed unit.79 Buttes Resources op-
erated a voluntarily pooled gas unit of 179 acres on which the Drisdale No. 1
gas well had been drilled. Adjacent to the Drisdale No. 1 unit were fifty-five
acres located above the Drisdale reservoir. The adjacent fifty-five acres were
downfield from the producing unit, and production from the Drisdale No. 1
well drained gas from the fifty-five acres tract, causing water to replace the
drained gas. The geological structure of the reservoir, therefore, was such
that the adjacent fifty-five acres "watered out" the Drisdale No. 1 unit pro-
duced gas.
Buttes at one time had leased the fifty-five acres. Buttes chose not to pool
the fifty-five acres with the Drisdale No. 1 unit and permitted the leases to
expire. J.L. Schneider, Jr., another defendant in the action, then leased the
fifty-five acres and offered to pool his fifty-five acres with the Drisdale No. 1
unit. Buttes refused the offer. At the time of Schneider's offer, thirty-three
71. 799 F.2d 149, 150-51 (5th Cir. 1986).
72. 727 S.W.2d at 291.
73. 378 S.W.2d 50, 55-56 (Tex. 1964).
74. 727 S.W.2d at 292-93.
75. Id. at 291-93 (citing Clark v. Perez, 679 S.W.2d 710, 714 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
1984, no writ)).
76. The three justices on the appeals panel split on the result in the case. Justice Cohen
wrote the panel's opinion. Justice Dunn concurred in the court's decision to reverse the sum-
mary judgment, but would have held that the royalty clauses were ambiguous. Id. at 293.
Justice Bass dissented, considering the issue to be the appropriate manner in which to calculate
the landowner royalty on the sulphur mined from the leases. Id. at 293-94.
77. 732 S.W.2d 675, 678 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ).
78. TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 102.001-.112 (Vernon 1978).
79. 732 S.W.2d at 678.
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acres had watered out, leaving only twenty-two acres of the original fifty-five
acres productive.
Schneider's voluntary pooling proposal included all fifty-five acres in the
enlarged unit. Schneider also proposed that each working interest owner in
the additional fifty-five acres reimburse the existing participants for the new
participant's share of the drilling and completion expenses of the Drisdale
No. 1 well. Each new interest owner's share of the expense would be calcu-
lated based on his pro rata share of the acreage in the enlarged unit. Each
new interest owner could elect either to pay his share of the drilling and
completion costs in cash shortly after the enlarged unit became effective or
to direct Buttes to recover from the new owner's share of production. If a
new interest owner chose to have his share of drilling and completion costs
withheld from future production, then Buttes would also be entitled to with-
hold an additional amount equal to the new interest owner's share of the
drilling and completion expenses. The parties referred to this additional
amount as a risk penalty. If a new interest owner chose to pay his share of
drilling and completion expenses in cash, he would not be required to pay a
risk penalty.
Since Buttes refused Schneider's offer to pool, Schneider obtained a Texas
Railroad Commission pooling order that was retroactively effective. On ap-
peal, the district court upheld the pooling order, but changed the effective
date so that the order was not retroactive.8 0 Buttes appealed and argued
that the Railroad Commission should not have issued the pooling order.
Schneider and the Texas Railroad Commission appealed the district court's
changing of the pooling order's effective date.
Under the Texas Mineral Interest Pooling Act,8 1 an interest owner seek-
ing to force pooling of his acreage with an existing unit by means of a com-
pulsory pooling order must first make a fair and reasonable offer to pool
voluntarily.8 2 The statute does not define a fair and reasonable offer for vol-
untary pooling. Moreover, the Texas Supreme Court has declined to define
a fair and reasonable offer.8 3
The Texas Supreme Court stated, however, that the pooling offer must be
one that considers the relevant facts existing at the time of the offer that a
reasonable person entering into a voluntary agreement concerning oil and
gas properties would consider important.8 4 In contesting the Railroad Com-
mission's compulsory pooling order, Buttes argued that Schneider's offer
was unreasonable because it did not provide for cash payments to Buttes as a
risk penalty for drilling the wildcat Drisdale No. 1 well. The Buttes court
acknowledged that a risk penalty might be a necessary factor in voluntary
offers to pool when the party seeking to join an existing unit originally had
been entitled to join in the drilling of the well.8 5 A risk factor recognizes
80. Id.
81. TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 102.001-.112 (Vernon 1978).
82. Id. § 102.013(b).
83. Carson v. Railroad Comm'n, 669 S.W.2d 315, 316 (Tex. 1984).
84. Id. (cited by Buttes, 732 S.W.2d at 678).
85. Buttes, 732 S.W.2d at 678.
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that the party seeking to join the unit previously had an opportunity to delay
his decision to share in the cost of the well until he determined whether or
not the well would be productive.8 6
In this case, however, Schneider did not hold leases to the adjacent fifty-
five acres when the Drisdale No. 1 well was drilled. In addition, the offer of
a risk penalty recoverable only out of production, and then only in the event
that the new interest owner failed to pay his share of the drilling and com-
pletion costs in cash, matched the manner in which the MIPA directs the
Texas Railroad Commission to handle costs, penalties, and methods of pay-
ment in its compulsory pooling orders.8 7 The Buttes court held, therefore,
that Schneider's offer of voluntary pooling was not unreasonable for failing
to provide a risk cash penalty.88
Buttes also argued that Schneider's offer was unreasonable because it pro-
posed to add all fifty-five acres to the existing unit, even though thirty-three
acres were no longer productive. The court rejected Buttes' arguments for
two reasons. First, the court noted that the Texas Railroad Commission
usually includes all of the originally productive acreage in water-drive reser-
voirs when it computes production allowable.89 The court noted that
although the commission had ordered only the twenty-two productive acres
to be pooled with the existing unit, the commission gave Buttes the option to
add all fifty-five acres to the unit.90 If Buttes exercised that option, the court
noted, all 55 acres would be assigned to the unit for proration purposes.91
As a second reason for rejecting Buttes's argument, the court noted that
Buttes might have wrongfully drained the adjacent fifty-five acres. 92 The
court could consider the fact that Buttes had drained the fifty-five acres
without compensating the landowners in determining the reasonableness of
Schneider's voluntary pooling offer.93
II. STATUTES
A. Business and Commerce Code
The Texas Legislature enacted a number of significant statutes during the
Survey period. The legislature amended section 9.319 of the Texas Business
and Commerce Code to grant, in certain instances, an automatically per-
fected security interest to an interest owner to secure his operator's obliga-
tion to remit the interest owner's share of production proceeds. 94 The
statute expanded the definition of a first purchaser to include an operator
receiving production proceeds from a third-party purchaser acting in good
86. Id.
87. TEX. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. § 102.052(a) (Vernon 1978).
88. 732 S.W.2d at 678.
89. Id.




94. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.319(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
[Vol. 42
OIL, GAS, AND MINERAL LAW
faith under a division order, or other agreement, signed by the operator. 95 If
a third-party purchaser pays the production proceeds jointly to the operator
and the interest owner, however, it appears that the statute does not deem
the operator to be a first purchaser. 96
The legislature also amended section 9.319 of the Business and Commerce
Code to remove an interest owner's right to insist that a third-party pur-
chaser deliver proceeds from oil production only to the interest owner (and
not to the operator) if the third-party purchaser wishes to terminate the in-
terest owner's section 9.319 security interest.97 Under the amended statute a
third-party purchaser may cut off an interest owner's section 9.319 security
interest by delivering the interest owner's proceeds either to the operator
alone (in which case the operator becomes the first purchaser) or jointly to
the interest owner and the operator.98
B. Natural Resources Code
In another significant legislative act, the Texas Legislature granted the
power of eminent domain to the state and its lessees to enable them to obtain
easements permitting access to minerals dedicated to the Permanent School
Fund.99 Various restrictions apply to this new statute.100 Additionally, the
legislature increased from sixty percent to eighty percent the portion of the
bonus, delay rentals, and royalties payable to the state under leases executed
on or after September 1, 1987, by surface owners as agents of the state cover-
ing minerals, other than oil and gas, reserved by the state.101 The legislature
also enacted penalties and other measures to deter surface owners of Relin-
quished Act lands from breaching their fiduciary duty to the state. 102
The legislature also gave the School Land Board discretion to temporarily
reduce the gas royalties payable under leases of gulf lands if the leases pro-
vide for royalty over twenty-five percent and meet specified conditions.10 3
The amount of the temporary reduction is linked to the price of natural
gas. 1° 4 The legislature also authorized the commissioner of the General
Land Office to allow payment of compensatory royalties as a substitute for
drilling offset wells to prevent drainage from public school, gulf, and Relin-
quishment Act lands.105
95. Id. § 9.319(q)(3).
96. See id. § 9.319(1)(1).
97. Act of Aug. 29, 1983, ch. 807, § 1, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4657, repealed by Act of
Sept. 1, 1987, ch. 601, §§ 1, 2, 1987 Tex. Gen. Laws 4715.
98. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.319(1)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
99. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 11.079(a) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
100. Id. § 11.079.
101. Id. § 53.065(b).
102. Id, § 52.189(d) (ten percent penalty); § 52.188(d)(2) (landowner owes state twice con-
sideration received by surface owner upon subsequent assignment of lease assigned to surface
owner without prior consent of General Land Office); see id. § 53.074 regarding state-owned
minerals other than oil and gas.
103. Id. § 52.036.
104. Id.
105. Id. §§ 52.034(d) and 52.173(d).
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